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CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS OF LAw-AnMissmn.ITY
OF CONFESSIONS UNDER THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT-The Supreme Court announced in 1936 that under certain circumstances the
admission of a confession into evidence by a state court could amount
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as

to a denial of due process
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.1 Since that time there has been an increasing number of appeals
seeking reversal of a conviction upon that ground and an expansion by
the Court of the types of factual situations which will render a confession inadmissible. 2 That this expansion reached its apex with the case
of Watts v. lndiancf and companion cases4 decided in 1949 appears
probable in the light of a recent denial of certiorari5 on facts similar to
the Watts case. 6 Considering this factor and also the intervening
change in court personnel,7 it seems appropriate to re-examine the issue
of adm~ssibility of confessions under the Fourteenth Amendment.

I. Theoretical Bases of Exclusion
When reversing a trial court conviction for error in the admission of
a confession into evidence, the Supreme Court usually assigns the reason that the confession was not made voluntarily.8 In order to understand this test, i. e., to know when a confession will be deemed voluntary, it is necessary to probe beneath the facts which give rise to an
inference of coercion and to examine the underlying theory. This is
true because three distinct concepts seem to be merged in the term "involuntary," viz., (l) an involuntary confession is unreliable; (2) a con1 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936). The defendants, uneducated Negroes, were subjected to the most brutal forms of violence and torture. The convictions were reversed.
2 In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921 (1944), the conviction was
reversed because the defendant was relentlessly interrogated in a situation "inherently
coercive." In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302 (1948), five hours of questioning
was held to render inadmissible the confession of a fifteen-year-old Negro boy. See McCormiclc, "Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions," 24
TEx. L. REv. 239 (1946).
3 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949). See 25 IND. L.J. 76 (1949); 1 SYRACUSE L.
REV, 313 (1950); 25 NOTRB DAME LAWYER 164 (1949).
4 Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 69 S.Ct. 1352 (1949) and Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 69 S.Ct. 1354 (1949).
0 Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844, 71 S.Ct. 9 (1950).
6 The Court was explicit in denying that a refusal of certiorari indicates any opinion
as· to the merits of the case. However, there was a vigorous dissent by Justice Douglas,
which would indicate that the merits were considered if not decided.
7 Justice Murphy died on July 19, 1949; Justice Clark took the oaths of office on
August 24, 1949. Justice Rutledge died on Sept. 10, 1949; Justice Minton took the oaths
of office Oct. 12, 1949.
s Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.
596, 68 S.Ct. 302 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945);
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S.
547, 62 S.Ct. 1139 (1942); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 60 S.Ct. 1032 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,
56 S.Ct. 461 (1936). Confessions were held to be voluntary in Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322
U.S. 596, 64 S.Ct. 1208 (1944) and in Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280
(1941).
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fession should not be admitted in evidence if extorted from the suspect
in violation of the principles against self-incrimination; and (3) a confession which is the product of illegality in procedure should not be
utilized as evidence.
A. The Trustworthiness Theory. Professor Wigrnore is the outstanding proponent of the theory that confessions are to be excluded
when elicited under conditions which are likely to produce a false confession. 9 It is urged that judicial experience demonstrates that in certain circumstances-usually described as a promise or a threat1°-a person may falsely admit guilt. Thus, when these circumstances are present, the confession is not trustworthy and should be excluded for lack of
probative value.
This theory of exclusion has found some judicial expression by the
Supreme Court. In Haley v. Ohio,11 Justice Burton said that the sole
issue was credibility. Justice Jackson, concurring in Watts v. Indiana,1 2
further elucidated this view saying:
"Of course, no confession that has been obtained by any form
of physical violence to the person is reliable and hence no conviction should rest upon one obtained in that manner. Such treatment not only breaks the will to conceal or lie, but may even break
the will to stand by the truth. Nor is it questioned that the same
result can sometimes be achieved by threats, promises, or inducements, which torture the mind but put no scar on the body."
The use of the term "involuntary" to denote the principle of exclusion because of untrustworthiness has been criticized by Professor Wigmore.13 It is a confusing word since all conscious verbal utterances are
and must be voluntary,14 and it rings of the privilege against self-in9 3 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE §822 (1940).
10 3 W1cMORE, EVIDENCE §825 (1940).

Wigmore disapproves of this rule of thumb
since it is not made to depend upon the measure of the force which the threat or promise
might have in causing falsity of confession.
11 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302 (1948).
12 338 U.S. 49 at 59-60, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949).
13 3 WmMORE, EVIDENCE §826, §843 (1940). ''The first objection to this test is of
course (1) that the fundamental question for confessions is whether there is any danger
that they may be untrue and that there is nothing in the mere circumstance of compulsion
to speak in general ••• which creates any risk of untruth. (2) Another argument against
it is that the privilege against self-crimination assumes • • • in its very existence that sta~
ments made without using it are admissible..•• (3) There is, however, a third way of
dealing with this doctrine; and that is to accept its principle-i.e. that a statement not
voluntary is to be excluded, irrespective of its truth or falsity,-but to deny that there can
be any compulsion in the mere facts of custody . . . because the person is always at liberty
to refuse to speak." 3 W1cMoRE, EVIDENCE 285-286 (1940).
14 Justice Jackson dissenting in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 at 156, 64 S.Ct.
921 (1944), said that arrest itself is inherently coercive, and so is detention. This does not
of itself make it bad. Accord, 3 WmMoRE, EVIDENCE §824 (1940).
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crimination.15 However, it is this inapt shorthand term which is ordinarily applied by the courts as the test of admissibility, and usually,
without reference to the question whether the utterance was so "involuntary" as to create a fair risk of falsity. 16
B. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Theory. Although
the distinction between the privilege against self-incrimination as contained in the Fifth Amendment' 7 and the rule of exclusion which renders some confessions inadmissible in evidence under the Fourteenth
Amendment:1 8 is clearly recognized by the Supreme Court,1 9 there is
much language which hints of some kind of a relationship between the
two. 20 The opinion of Justice Frankfurter in a recent case is illustrative:
"Under our system society carries the burden of proving its
charge against the accused not out of his own mouth. It must
establish its case, not by interrogation of the accused even under
judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently secured
through skillful investigation. 'The law will not suffer a prisoner
to be made the deluded instrument of his own conviction.' " 21
Professor Wigmore rejects this theory as a basis for the exclusion of
confessions obtained through what is popularly known as "third degree"
methods. 22 He contends that the two theories are distinct- historically23 and in application.24 There are few who would deny this asser15 The privilege against self-ipcrimination protects against a compulsory disclosure in
certain circumstances. Thus, in speaking of this privilege, judges often use the phrase
"involuntary confession."
16 Cf. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §826 (1940).
17U.S. CoNsT., Amendment 5 provides: "No person ••• shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. . • ."
18 See note 1 supra.
19Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908); Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947).
20 See McCormick, ''The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence," 16 T:sx. L.
REv. 447 at 451-457 (1938).
21 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 at 54, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949). See also Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1941) where Justice Roberts, speaking for the
majority, said that the aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively
false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true
or false.
22 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §823 (1940); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2266 (1940).
23 " ••• the history of the two principles is wide apart, differing by one hundred years
in origin, and derived through separate lines of precedents. . . ." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
387 (1940). See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §818 and 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2250 (1940).
24 "(a) The confession-rule is broader, because it may exclude statements which are
obtained without compulsion; (b) Where the privilege is waived or not claimed, the confession-rule may still operate to exclude; ••. (d) Where testimony, though given under
oath, does not violate the confession-rule, it may still involve a violation of the privilege;
(e) The privilege applies to witnesses as such, in civil and in criminal cases, but the
confession-rule is concerned only with party-defendants in criminal cases••••" 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE 387 (1940).
'
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tion, but the repetition of statements with overtones of privilege concepts is at least indicative of a feeling that the two exclusionary rules
have much in common.25
C. ·Protection Against Illegality in Procedure T~eory. The purpose of an arrest is to take a person suspected of a crime into custody in
order that he may be present to answer a specific charge.26 It is ordinarily provided that the suspect must be taken before a committing
magistrate promptly, or without unreasonable delay, after arrest. 27
When a suspect is arrested and interrogated by enforcement officials
after a reasonable time for arraignment has expired, it has been suggested that any confession obtained during the period of unlawful detention should be excluded without regard to the voluntary nature of
the confession.28 The purpose of.such a rule is to prevent police misconduct.
Use of exclusionary rules of evidence to promote this objective has
been severely criticized by most authorities. 29 The foundation of this
criticism is the lack of a necessary relationship between police abuses
and the trustworthy character of the confession.30 Upon the assumption that confessions are excluded only when there is likelihood of
falsityi this criticism is sound.31 However, if exclusion is viewed from
the privilege standpoint, the privilege may well be extended to include
protection against police abuses resulting in a confession. Recognition
of a privilege against the use of the confession would provide the per25 "It well may be that the adherence of the courts to this form of statement of the
confession-rule in terms of 'voluntariness' is prompted not only by a liking for its convenient brevity, but also by a recognition that there is an interest here to be protected closely
akin to the interest of a witness or of an accused person which is protected by the privilege
against compulsory self-crimination. • • • It is significant that the shadow of the rack and
the thumbscrew was part of the background from which each rule emerged." McCormick,
"The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence," 16 TEX. L. REv. 447 at 452-453 (1938).
See 3 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE §§856-859 (1940).
2 6 ''The purpose of arrest, under our law, is not the sequestration of a suspected pi:rson
.or his interrogation, but the insurance of his responding to a criminal charge." 11 U.S.
COMMISSION ON LAw OBSERVANCE (Wickersham Commission), "Lawlessness in Law Enforcement" 33 (1931). For a lucid summary of the rules governing arrest see, Waite, ''The
Law of Arrest," 24 TEX. L. REv. 279 (1946). See also DAX AND TmBs, ArurasT, SEARCH
AND Smzmm (1946).
212 R.C.L. 466 (1914). This is largely a matter of statute. It is ordinarily provided
that the person arrested be produced before a magistrate "promptly" or "forthwith" or
"without delay."
28 See Civil Rights Committee of the American Bar Association, "Memorandum on
the Detention, etc.," pp. 17 et seq. (1944).
2 0 42 MrCH. L. REv. 679 and 909 (1944); 3 WrGMORE, EVIDENCE 318-320 (1940).
30 Professor Waite urges against freeing the criminal in order to discipline law enforcement officers. See 42 MrCH. L. REv. 679 and 909 (1944).
31 The fact that the police have interrogated or have failed promptly to arraign the
suspect does not per se mean that the confession was coerced although it may be strongly
suggestive of such a conclusion.
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son arrested an effective remedy for violations of the right to prompt
arraignment and the right to be free from abusive interrogation. 32
The Supreme Court has often denied enforcement agencies the
use of the fruits of their illicit methods. Justice Douglas contended that
this principle is applicable to confessions obtained during an unlawful
detention in Watts v. Indiana:
"We should unequivocally condemn ... [detention without
arraignment] and stand ready to outlaw ... any confession obtained during the period of the unlawful detention. The procedure
breeds coerced confessions. It is the root of the evil. It is the
procedure without which the inquisition could not Hourish in the
country."33

II. Application of the Bases of Exclusion
The e~tent of interference with state law enforcement practice
varies according to which of the three bases of exclusion is adopted.
Therefore, it is important to consider the scope of review and the
nature of the evil sought to be remedied by exclusion of certain confessions.
A. Scope of Review. If the trustworthiness theory is adopted,
the sole issue becomes one of credibility. Thus the finding of the trial
court and jury that the confession was voluntary becomes entitled to
great weight since they are in a position to observe the behavior of the
witnesses. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court is whether there
was substantial evidence upon which the trial court and jury might reasonably have made a finding of voluntariness.34
Review under the theory of privilege seems to be more extensive.
The fact of voluntariness, although primarily for state determination,
is determinative of a constitutional right. The state court's finding is
accepted only so far as is necessary to resolve a conllict in the testimony
concerning the coercion. The effect of the activities alleged on appeal
3 2 See 48 MICH. L. REv. 1028 (1950). See also the concurring opinion of Justice
Frankfurter in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302 (1948), and the dissenting
opinion of Justice Douglas in Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844, 71 S.Ct. 9 (1950).
Cf. 3 WmMORE, EVIDENCE 319-320 (1940) and 1949 Supp., §851 (1949). See Inbau,
"The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court," 43 Iu.. L. REv. 442
(1948).
33 338 U.S. 49 at 57, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949).
34. See the dissenting opinion of Justice Burton in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68
S.Ct. 302 (1948). Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Jackson concurred. These
same four justices dissented in Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 69 S.Ct. 1352 (1949)
and in Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 69 S.Ct. 1354 (1949) and all except
Justice Jackson dissented in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949).
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to have coerced the confession is for the Supreme Court to determine
anew. 36
Penetrating even deeper into state procedural practices is the rule
of exclusion based upon illegality leading to the confession. This rule
would seem to require reversal of the conviction on the ground that
state procedure must measure favorably to a standard set by the Supreme Court.36 For this reason it is of greater threat to the delicate
balance between state and federal powers.
B. Nature and Extent of Abuses by Law Enforcement Officials.
The Wickersham Commission submitted an extended report to President Hoover on the subject of "Lawlessness in Law Enforcement" in
1931.37 The report indicates that, "the employment of methods which
inflict suffering, physical or mental, upon a person, in order to obtain ...
information about a crime"38-or "third degree"-is widespread, and
that detentions in violation of prompt arraignment statutes and detentions incommunicado are common.39 These abuses of the administrative process are likely to fall on the poor, the uninB.uential, the
racial minorities, and those of subnormal mentality. 40 Nor is the "third
degree" limited to the obviously guilty or to those eventually found
guilty.41
Several reasons have been advanced in justification of the use of
"third degree" and unlawful detention. Jt has been argued that these
methods are necessary to obtain the facts. 42 The criminal must be
35 See the opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct.
1347 (1949).
36 The state law respecting length of time within which a suspect must be taken
before the committing magistrate could not bind the Supreme Court in its determination
of whether the suspect had been accorded due process of law, but state laws are suggestive
of a standard of fairness.
3 711 U.S. CoMl\UssroN ON LAW OBSERVANCE (Wickersham Commission), "Lawlessness in Law Enforcement" (1931).
38 This is the definition of "third degree" adopted by the Commission. See p. 3 of
the report.
39 11 U.S. CoMl\ussroN ON LAW OBSERVANCE (Wickersham Commission), "Lawlessness in Law Enforcement," p. 3 (1931).
4 Chapter 3, pp. 156-161, of the report states that of the 106 appellate cases, 6 involved women or girls. Of the 36 appellate decisions in which an age was given, in 23
the victim was under 25. The field investigators reported that "third degree" practices were
particularly harsh in the case of Negroes. Of the 106 appellate cases, 7 involved mental
defectives. The likelihood of abuse is less when the prisoner is in contact with an attorney.
The poor and uninHuential are less apt to be so represented. Five Supreme Court decisions have involyed Negroes.
41 11 U.S. CoMMissroN ON LAw OBSERVANCE (Wickersham Commission), "Lawlessness in Law Enforcement," pp. 161-164 (1931).
42 Id. at pp. 174-176. The criminal law enforcement record of Great Britain is very
good and in that country answers to questions put by an officer to a person in custody are
not admissible. See 3 WrcMORB, EVIDENCE 292 (1940).
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persuaded to talk, and he must be kept away from his lawyer who will
either advise him to remain silent or will secure his release. 43 It has
also been suggested that lax and inefficiel!_t prosecutors require the
police to build up a solid case prior to arraignment or see the prisoner
elude conviction and perhaps even prosecution. 44 In addition, arrests
must in some cases be secret to permit the rest of the "gang" to be
apprehended; and organized criminals cannot be detected unless one
of the group can be persuaded to give information about the others.45
In rebuttal it is said that detention and interrogation of suspects
for these purposes encourages inadequate investigation by the police
and prosecutor since a confession makes their task so much simpler. 46
Also, these practices impair the efficient administration of criminal justice in the courts by raising collateral issues concerning the admissibility of the confession,47 and lower public esteem and confidence in the
law enforcement system.48
Other arguments to sustain exclusion of confessions have been built
around certain substantive rights contained in state statutes and constitutions, e. g., the accused's right to a writ of habeas corpus is unlawfully suspended,49 his right to bail is denied,50 and his right to be free
from being compelled to give evidence against himself is violated.51
These arguments appea:i; to have merit from the standpoint of an effective guarantee of such rights,. However, it has not as yet been held
that detention for an unlawful length of time or coercive interrogation
per se raise issues under the Fourteenth Amendment,52 even though
43 If efficient law enforcement is impossible so long as these rights exist, they should
be removed by statute or constitutional amendment rather than simply ignored or abused.
44 The solution indicated would seem to be better prosecution, not more violent arrest
and detention.
45 It is significant that no gangs have been involved in cases before the Supreme Court
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment cases have involved nonprofessional crimes committed by unorganized groups and usually single individuals.
46 11 U.S. CoMMISSION ON I.Aw OBSERVANCB (Wickersham Commission), ''Lawlessness in Law Enforcement" 187-189 (1931).
47Jd. at 189-190.
48 There is also the grave danger of false confessions. This objection was considered
earlier under the theoretical bases of exclusion.
49 The federal right to a writ of habeas corpus extends to a prisoner only when he is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States. 28
U.S.C. (1948) §2241. Thus it is necessary to show that the detention prior to trial is a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to obtain a release. It would seem that
in a harsh case, the writ might extend. The prisoner is ordinarily granted adequate pretrial protection by the state courts.
50 Practically all states gnarantee the right to bail.
51 See note 19 supra.
52 If we accept the view of Justice Black that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates
the first eight amendments as expressed in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct.
1672 (1947), it could be argued that detention incommunicado is violative of the right to
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there is just as much a deprivation of liberty as there is when an accused
is sentenced under a verdict resting upon his coerced confession.

III. Conclusion
It is apparent from the type of argument which any consideration
of "third degree" and unlawful detention raise that the problem is
essentially local in character.63 It seems that the Supreme Court should,
therefore, reverse a conviction only when the trial court and state
appellate court show some want of proper standards of decision which
is of sufficient gravity to amount to a fundamental unfaimess.64 This
fundamental unfairness is found when a defendant faces forfeiture of
his life55 through a verdict resting upon insufficient evidence, this insufficiency being due to the fact that an untrustworthy confession was
admitted in evidence and relied upon by the jury-at least in part.56
That this is the trend of recent decisions in the Supreme Court is
evidenced somewhat by the recent denial of certiorari57 on facts similar68 to the Watts case.:rn It is believed that the change in Court percounsel. However, even if it is conceded that this right is protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the most sweeping dicta goes no further than to assert that the right exists
from the time of arraignment. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 at 69, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932).
Therefore, it seems that denial of counsel from the moment of arrest is but a factor to be
weighed in considering whether the confession was the product of coercion. Cf. Ward v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 62 S.Ct. 1139 (1942), where Justice Byrnes asserts that detention
incommunicado without advice of friends or counsel is a sufficient cause for reversal.
53 ''The real remedy lies in the will of the community. If the community insists upon
higher standards in police, prosecutors, and judges, the third degree will cease to be a
systematic practice." II U.S. CoM:MISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT (Wickersham Commission), "Lawlessness in Law Enforcement" 191 (1931). See Kauper, "Judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree," 30 MICH. L. REv. 1224 (1932).
54 "If the right of interrogation be admitted, then it seems to me that we must leave
it to [the] trial judges and juries and state appellate courts to decide individual cases, unless
they show some want of proper standards of decision." Jackson concurring in Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 at 61, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949).
55 The confession cases which have reached the Supreme Court under the Fourteenth
Amendment have involved capital crimes.
56 In Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936), Chief Justice Hughes
said that the trial is a mere pretense where the state authorities have contrived a conviction
resting solely upon confessions obtained by violence.
57 Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844, 71 S.Ct. 9 (1950).
58 The defendant was arrested on Dec. 17, 1947. He was questioned for three hours
at that time, taken to dinner, and questioned until 11: 30 p.m. He was detained for the
night, taken to lunch on Dec. 18, and questioned in the cellar of the police station until
5:00 p.m. He then said that he was willing to talk and was taken to the council room.
He was showed his bloody clothing and became hysterical. A doctor was summoned. At
10:00 p.m. he confessed the shooting. He was arraigned on the 21st. Held, the confession
is admissible since it was voluntary. Commonwealth v. Agoston, 364 Pa. 464, 72 A. (2d)
575 (1950).
u9 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949).
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sonnel since the Watts case60 contributed in some measure to the
Court's refusal to grant certiorari. On these premises, the conclusion
seems justified that the Supreme Court is moving to a position of greater
deference to the state court's finding of voluntariness with respect to
confessions. 61 This position is well taken for it accords with the trustworthiness theory of exclusion and recognizes that state appellate
benches, too, are normally possessed of refined concepts of "civilized
standards."
Harold G. Christensen, S.Ed.

60 Justices Murphy and Rutledge concurred in the opinion of Justice Frankfurter in
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949), in reversing the conviction. See
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430 (1950) where Justice Minton,
writing for the majority, extended the definition of "reasonable" to sustain a conviction
attacked under the Fourth Amendment. Justices Clark, Reed, Burton, and the Chief
Justice joined.
61 See note 34 supra.

